Iraq: Tariq Aziz's trial begins

Yesterday, the Iraqi Special Tribunal opened the trial of Tariq Aziz, a former Iraqi deputy prime minister and one of Saddam Hussein's most prominent lieutenants, who is charged of genocide for approving the execution of scores of business people while Iraq faced economic sanctions. Aziz's team of lawyers includes our favorite, Jacques Verges, who has a history of defending some of the most evil men of contemporary history. (Read more about Verges from this previous post).

The court quickly adjourned yesterday, however, due to the fact that a co-defendant, Ali Hassan al-Majid (a.k.a. "Chemical Ali"), was too ill to attend. Chemical Ali is already on death row and was sentenced to hang. In June 2007, he was convicted of genocide, crimes against humanity, and war crimes for the slaughter of hundreds of thousands of Kurds during the "Anfal" campaigns. For background on the genocidal "Anfal" campaigns in Iraq of 1988, click here.

It is also important to note that the procedures of trials in the Iraqi Special Tribunal have come under some scrutiny from human rights groups. Human Rights Watch has extensively written on flaws of the tribunal, especially regarding Saddam Hussein's trial, which found him guilty of committing crimes against humanity in Dujail. Below are some of the flaws that have been highlighted in their reports.

Regarding the trial:
• regular failure to disclose key evidence, including exculpatory evidence, to the defense in advance;
• violations of the defendants’ basic fair trial right to confront witnesses against them;
• lapses of judicial demeanor that undermined the apparent impartiality of the presiding judge; and
• important gaps in evidence that undermine the persuasiveness of the prosecution case, and put in doubt whether all the elements of the crimes charged were established.

Regarding the judgment:
• Relying solely on the defendants’ government positions to establish that they had knowledge and intent to commit the crimes;
• Failing to show the actual lines of command and control needed to establish the responsibility of leaders for the acts of their subordinates;
• For lower-level defendants, relying on their status as Ba`th party members to show that they had the intent to commit the crimes without pointing to evidence of the nature of the Ba`th regime and instead relying on “common knowledge” to determine the defendant’s individual criminal intent; and,
• Failure to address numerous instances of same-day or late disclosure of prosecution evidence to the defense that was used at trial.