2008 Global Peace Index Rankings

The 2008 rankings of the Global Peace Index were released yesterday. Backed by distinguished individuals such as Professor Joseph Stiglitz and Archbishop Desmond Tutu, this new index now in its second year ranks countries by their relative peacefulness. It takes into account 24 internal and external factors, including levels of violence and UN activities. For the nerdy readers that care, you can check out the methodology of the study here.
Here is the overall map of their findings (Blue for most peaceful; red for least peaceful):


According to the rankings, the top 10 "non-peaceful," violent countries are (in order):

1. Iraq
2. Somalia
3. Sudan
4. Afghanistan
5. Israel
6. Chad
7. Central African Republic
8. N. Korea
9. Lebanon
10. Russia

Though the first nine make sense, as the Foreign Passport posted, is Russia really more violent than conflict-torn countries such as Burma, the Democratic Republic of Congo, and Colombia? Some of the reasons the index states for this are: high military spending, booming arms sales, poor relations with its neighbors, high scores for homicides, jailed population, distrust among citizens, and violent crime. Though all these factors do ring true, from a non-technical viewpoint, it just seems odd that other regimes that thrive on violent repression are more "peaceful".

Other interesting tidbits:

• The US is ranked far from the top of most peaceful countries, ranking 97th out of the 140 countries. (e.g. Iraq, Afghanistan)
  
• The UK is one of the least peaceful nations in Europe.
  
• Iceland is the most peaceful nation in the world.
  
• The majority of the countries in the world have slightly improved since last year.
  

S. Africa: Zimbabwean refugees trapped

(Image from NYT)

As state-sponsored violence continues in Zimbabwe with the run-off elections now delayed until June 27th, waves of innocent victims and displaced people have been fleeing across the border to South Africa.
On April 21st, a New York Times article described Zimbabweans in South Africa warmly welcoming the refugees that were able to escape:
"For the people who make it through, there is a pipeline of sympathy waiting on the other side. Fellow Zimbabweans living in South Africa — often perfect strangers — have taken in border jumpers, giving them a safe house and a warm cup of porridge, and helping them along their way to Messina, about 10 miles south, and then onward to the bigger cities of Johannesburg and Cape Town."

Shockingly, a mere few weeks later, the situation has been reversed. Those Zimbabweans that were offering the porridge are now running for their lives. A nation-wide torrent of xenophobic riots have been terrifying innocent foreigners for the past two weeks. The causes of these riots allegedly come from deep-rooted economic problems within South Africa. As the divide between the rich and the poor has been widening, the urban poor often blame foreigners for taking up their jobs. Zimbabweans make up the largest immigrant group in S. Africa (about 3 million people).

One South African security guard, according to the LA Times said:
"People feel angry with Zimbabweans...People get jealous because they see these people progressing. Zimbabweans are good at crafts and they all speak perfect English."

These anti-foreigner riots sparked as the hordes of refugees from Zimbabwe entered the country as a result of the political crisis in the north. Over 20,000 people have been displaced and dozens have been killed. Many have fled their homes and have taken refuge in churches and police stations. Human rights violations are running rampant -- people have been burned alive, shops have been looted, homes have been razed, women have been raped, and many foreigners have been subject to gruesome beatings by angry mobs.

Fearing for disruptions in their tourism sectors as the country is currently undergoing an electricity crisis, the South African government has intensified efforts to quell the violence. These "efforts" have not really surfaced yet and, furthermore, does not mean much for the Zimbabweans who are trapped between two areas where they really do not want to be in.

Regional countries such as Botswana and Mozambique need to pro-actively take leadership and open their borders to offer safe haven for those who are sandwiched between areas of violence. Assuming the crisis in Zimbabwe will continue at least for another few months, it is also critical that the international community aid the South African government in putting an end to the violence as soon as possible and in jump-starting a process to reform their immigration policies.

A Supreme Court Blunder

(Image from Supreme Court website)

The US Supreme Court was to decide last week whether or not they would hear American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza, a highly controversial case where 50 US companies are being sued for $400 billion for doing business in South Africa during its apartheid-era. Rather than deciding one way or the other, however, the majority of the court announced on May 12 that the case could not be heard, as too many justices have dropped out of the decision for personal/financial reasons.

The dropouts come from a federal law that bars judges from hearing cases in which they own even a single stock in companies that are parties to the case.
For American Isuzu Motors, Inc. v. Ntsebeza:

• Chief Justice Roberts owns stock in Hewlett Packard
• Justice Samuel Alito Jr. owns stock in Exxon Mobil
• Justice Stephen Breyer owns stock in several, including Nestle, IBM, and Bank of America
• Justice Anthony Kennedy dropped out due to his son's employment at Credit Suisse.
  

In order for the court to operate, 6 out of 9 judges need to be present. By default, the Supreme Court could not hear this case. Treating the outcome as a deadlock, the court said the case would be allowed to automatically proceed.

Two big inferences can be drawn from this incident.

First, this should be an eye-opener for activists, especially those who have been pressuring high-profile policymakers and government official to divest from companies. Will this open up a pandora's box for new perspectives and tactics for divestment campaigns?

Second, the Supreme Court just let slip what could have become a landmark case regarding the Alien Tort Claims Act (ATCA), a statute from 1789 that attorneys have been using to sue companies for complicity in human rights abuses abroad. The Supreme Court ruled in 2004 (in the case of Sosa v. Alvarez-Machain) that ATCA cases must be treated with great care as it could impose upon US foreign policy and step on the Legislative and Executive branches' toes. However, class action attorneys have been continuing to use ATCA as grounds to uphold corporate responsibility of US companies and pursue justice for human rights. As the Sosa decision left "the door ajar" for these law suits to continue in US courts, many were awaiting how the Supreme Court would rule for this apartheid case.

More on ATCA to come soon. For now:

• See this comprehensive speech by DOJ Legal Advisor John Bellinger for the US government's cautionary view of using ATCA in human rights litigation.
  
• See Human Rights Watch's page for the perspective on defending the use of ATCA in human rights litigation.
  

Darfur: Early steps to war?

(Image from Sudan Tribune)

Actus Rei's latest post on Darfur highlighted a series of aerial bombardments that have been targeting marketplaces and schools in Darfurian villages. Other forms of violence have been continuing as well, as disputes over the skewed, national census led to fighting in South Darfur that reportedly forced 12,000 refugees to flee the region.

Frustrations mounting, the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), a prominent Islamist rebel group, launched a rapid invasion towards Khartoum, the Sudanese capital, 400 miles away from the Darfur region. On May 11, hundreds of JEM soldiers with allegedly 700 vehicles forcefully invaded through the Kordofan region (neighboring Darfur) and began to attack the major city of Omdurman near the capital. As the rebels reached the capital, the Sudanese government fought the rebels back after declaring a citywide curfew, deploying attack helicopters, and sending hundreds of troops.

The attack led the government to start a massive hunt for rebels within Khartoum that reportedly fed the JEM information regarding the Sudanese army. The government called for the immediate arrest of Khalil Ibrahim, the head of JEM, and announced a US$246 million bounty. Human Rights Watch suspects that the government is systematically rounding up and arresting over 100 opposition members and fears for the conditions in which they will be placed while detained.

Meanwhile, per usual, Sudan accused its neighbor Chad of supporting the rebel attack and cut off diplomatic relations. In response, Chad denied any involvement, proceeding to close its borders to Sudan, ban Sudanese airlines to the country, and freeze assets in Sudanese banks.

So what does this mean? Given the rebels' insufficient numbers for a successful coup, this attack left the world puzzled as to what exactly its purpose was...is this the beginning of the breakout of all-out war? Khalil Ibrahim said on Monday that JEM will continue attacks until the government fell and that: "this is just the start of a process and the end is the termination of this regime." Experts have begun to throw out there that this may be a turning point for the Sudanese regime to pursue serious negotiations with the opposition. We can only hope that this is the case.

Iraq: Consequences of the Surge

(Image from AFP)

The Council of Foreign Relations published a comprehensive article in Foreign Affairs that details the effects that the US "surge" in military forces had on the conflict in Iraq.

Though the article makes clear that the surge indeed did contribute to reducing violence against civilians in Iraq, it also argues that it had an effect only in conjunction with many other factors, including:

• "the grim successes of ethnic cleansing" (most of the ethnic cleansing has already been completed)
  
• "the tactical quiescence of Shiite militias" (part of the "ebbs and flows" of insurgencies)
  
• "a series of deals between US and Sunni tribes" (since mid-2007, the US military has been striking deals with anti-al Qaeda Sunni militias -- according to the article, the US has budgeted $150 million to pay Sunni tribes this year)
  

The article further argues that the current "bottom-up" strategy that the US surge is taking (e.g. funding and equipping Sunni militias) has been undermining long term goals of a stable Iraqi state. The following inter-related consequences were highlighted:

• Fostering "retribalization": By empowering local leaders with (corrupt) financial opportunities (e.g. Sunni leaders profiting from these deals), the article argues how these efforts are advancing further splintering of Iraq.
• Growth of "warlordism": The surge has been pursuing this "tribal" empowerment without any regulation to the group's relationship with the state. As a result, the leaders that have profited gain substantial power.
  
• Worsening sectarianism: Distorted perceptions of the US strategy of empowering Sunni leaders have led to emboldened efforts of Shiite leaders such as Moktada al-Sadr to pursue Shiite hegemony.

The article advocates for a complete return to a "top-down" strategy, while responsibly withdrawing troops to cede control of the situation to other international allies such as the European Union. After the US makes a public commitment to a phased, responsible withdrawal; the article hopes for the international community to collectively empower the central government and hold provincial elections, increase humanitarian aid and foreign investments, and intertwine the "tribes" that have been empowered by the US surge to the central government.

Though the conclusion is well-argued, one aspect the article fails to take into account are the pros that come from a "bottom-up" approach. Particularly in a country like Iraq where the interests of each group have become so entrenched and deeply-rooted in preserving their identity, it is critical that all these views are represented properly in national political dialogue. Empowering local communities, if done properly, is a necessary step in jump-starting post-conflict progress for peace and unity. Therefore, rather than advocating for a complete 180, the strategy going forward for long-term unity in Iraq requires both a "top-down" approach combined with a considerable degree of responsible "bottom-up" tactics to ensure that all groups are satisfied in the representation they have. Without this balance, the consequences of the surge that the article lists will most likely never be resolved.

A better perspective on Burma and R2P

See the excerpt below from a Guardian article by Gareth Evans of the International Crisis Group, also one of the co-chairs of the group that wrote R2P. The article offers a better defined perspective of what I had written in my previous post.

"Facing Up to Our Responsibilities"

12 May 2008
The Guardian

"...French Foreign Minister Bernard Kouchner opened up a hornet’s nest when he argued last Thursday, as others are now doing, that this is a proper case for coercive intervention under the "responsibility to protect" principle unanimously endorsed by 150 heads of state and government at the 2005 UN World Summit. His proposal that the Security Council pass a resolution which "authorizes the delivery and imposes this on the Burmese government" met with immediate rejection not only from China and Russia, who are always sensitive about external intervention into internal affairs, but from many other quarters as well.

It generated concern from the UK and others, including senior UN officials, that such an "incendiary" approach would be wholly counterproductive in winning any still-possible cooperation from the generals. It also provoked the argument from humanitarian relief agencies – who know what they are talking about – that simply as a practical matter any effort to drop supplies without an effective supporting relief on the ground would be hopelessly inefficient, and maybe even dangerous with the prospect of misuse of medical supplies.

...My own initial concern, and it remains a serious one, with Bernard Kouchner’s invocation of the "responsibility to protect" was that, while wholly understandable as a political rallying cry – and God knows the world needs them in these situations – it had the potential to dramatically undercut international support for another great cause, to which he among others is also passionately committed, that of ending mass atrocity crimes once and for all.

The point about "the responsibility to protect" as it was originally conceived, and eventually embraced at the World Summit – as I well know, as one of the original architects of the doctrine, having co-chaired the international commission that gave it birth – is that it is not about human security generally, or protecting people from the impact of natural disasters, or the ravages of HIV-AIDS or anything of that kind.

Rather, "R2P" is about protecting vulnerable populations from "genocide, war crimes, ethnic cleansing and crimes against humanity" in ways that we have all too miserably often failed to do in the past, That is the language of the 2005 UN General Assembly resolution, and Security Council resolutions that have followed it, and it is only in that context that the question should even arise of coercively intervening in a country against the express will of its government. And even then, the responsibility to protect norm allows the use of military force only with Security Council endorsement, and only as a last resort, after prevention has failed, when it is clear that no less extreme form of reaction could possibly halt or avert the harm in question, that the response is proportional to that harm, and that on balance more good than damage will be done by the intervention.

If it comes to be thought that "R2P", and in particular the sharp military end of the doctrine, is capable of being invoked in anything other than a context of mass atrocity crimes, then such consensus as there is in favour of the new norm will simply evaporate in the global South. And that means that when the next case of genocide or ethnic cleansing comes along we will be back to the same old depressing arguments about the primacy of sovereignty that led us into the horrors of inaction in Rwanda and Srebrenica in the 1990s.

But here’s the rub. If what the generals are now doing, in effectively denying relief to hundreds of thousands of people at real and immediate risk of death, can itself be characterised as a crime against humanity, then the responsibility to protect principle does indeed cut in. The Canadian-sponsored commission report that initiated the R2P concept in fact anticipated just this situation, in identifying one possible case for the application of military force as "overwhelming natural or environmental catastrophes, where the state concerned is either unwilling or unable to cope, or call for assistance, and significant loss of life is occurring or threatened".

The UN resolution does not pick up this specific language, but it does refer to "crimes against humanity", and the definition of such crimes (in the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, as well as in customary international law) embraces, along with widespread or systematic murder, torture, persecution and the like, "Other inhumane acts of a similar character intentionally causing great suffering, or serious injury to body or to mental or physical health".

There is, as always, lots for the lawyers to argue about in all of this, not least on the question of intent. And there will be lots for the Security Council to quarrel about as to whether air drops and the like are justified, legally, morally and practically. But when a government default is as grave as the course on which the Burmese generals now seem to be set, there is at least a prima facie case to answer for their intransigence being a crime against humanity – of a kind which would attract the responsibility to protect principle. And that bears thinking about, fast, both by the Security Council, and the generals."

Lebanon: Resurging violence in Beirut

Burma and R2P: Will barriers break down?

For more background on Burma, see previous post. For background on the Responsibility to Protect ("R2P"), click here.

As has been widely discussed in the press, Burma has experienced an unexpected tragedy that led the military regime to slightly alter its isolationist foreign policy. Up to 100,000 people have died and masses of people have become homeless and are suffering as a result of a catastrophic cyclone that hit Burma's coasts. Countries around the world, including the US, have taken the necessary steps to initiate relief efforts and have expressed they are anxious to help. However, the Burmese regime continues to disallow foreigners to enter its borders and has been delaying the granting of visas to UN relief agencies and aid workers. The victims that are perhaps suffering the most are those whose villages have been wiped out in the remote areas of ethnic states, where the Burmese regime has been conducting military campaigns of repression and committing mass atrocities for over a decade.

Amidst the widespread global response to this crisis, the NY Times caught something that is of particular interest to this blog -- the French foreign minister Bernard Kouchner invoked the Responsibility to Protect ("R2P") doctrine and argued that it should be used as the rationale for a UN resolution to have invade Burmese sovereignty to deliver international aid to Burmese civilians that have been affected by the disaster.

The R2P doctrine was born out of a report commissioned by former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan challenging policymakers to address the various obstacles that exist regarding military interventions into sovereign states at times of crises (ie: humanitarian intervention). R2P findings suggest that if a state is unwilling or unable to halt measures that are causing serious harm to its citizens, "the principle of non-intervention yields to the international responsibility to protect." In other words, it is up to the international community to uphold what would be the state's responsibility to protect its citizens from harm.

Usually, activists and policymakers invoke R2P in cases where armed peacekeepers need to be sent into sovereign countries when the states, themselves, are committing mass atrocities. For example, UN Resolution 1769, which authorized the deployment of the UN-African Union hybrid peacekeeping force in Darfur, cited R2P as a rationale to protect the citizens that were suffering by the hands of the Sudanese government's genocidal campaigns.

This is most likely the first time that a state official has cited R2P as a basis for humanitarian aid to be delivered. Though Kouchner's statement does spark widespread controversy, this may be a step towards establishing that the concept of R2P is slowly becoming accepted as an international norm. Coalitions of NGOs and advocacy groups have been working hard to raise awareness of what R2P means and the Stimson Center has published a comprehensive volume on how to operationalize the concept.

To do justice to the other end of this debate, the Heritage Foundation just published a controversial report that advocates for how the US should keep to protecting its national interests and reject the R2P doctrine. This argument encapsulates the cause of perennial debate over whether evolving international norms of protecting human rights around the world can overcome states' national interests at times of crisis - a debate that is a constant headache for decision-making bodies such as the UN Security Council.

If R2P is invoked in a UN Security Council resolution for the current situation in Burma (even if it is just to send in relief efforts), it may lead to the barriers of the isolationist regime breaking down to finally allow some progress towards investigating, stopping, and bringing to justice the military regime in committing mass atrocities against innocent civilians. Thus far, the UN has been able to do very little in combating the stubborn policies of the Burmese government.

ICTR: Kalimanzira's trial begins

For background on the Rwandan genocide, click here.

The trial of former Acting Minister of the Interior Callixte Kalimanzira began at the International Criminal Tribunal of Rwanda (ICTR) on May 5th. In respect to coordinating the massacres of an estimated 800,000 Tutsis in 1994, Kalimanzira is charged of genocide, complicity in genocide and with direct and public incitement of genocide. Of course, the defendant is pleading not guilty to all charges. According to the chief prosecutor, Kalimanzira played a "key role" as victims of genocide will be directly testifying in court.

In other news, Kenya has frozen the assets of a Felicien Kabuga, a wealthy Hutu business man and the currently most wanted suspect tied to the Rwandan genocide. The US has a $5 million bounty on his head, according to Reuters. Testimony in the ICTR has found that his transactions have been "substantially interfering" with prosecution witnesses at the court.

The ICTR has thus far convicted twenty-eight former-Rwandan government ministers, members of parliament and military officers for various degrees of complicity during the 1994 genocide.

Currently, there is tension between the UN Security Council and international criminal tribunals regarding the mandate of the ICTR. The Security Council has directed all first instance trials to close by the end of the year and all appeals to be concluded by 2010. As some lawyers point to the fact that steps have been taken to facilitate a transition of jurisdiction to Rwandan courts, closing the court prematurely will be a detrimental move in promoting impunity.

Darfur: More attacks on villages

As the Sudanese government's genocidal campaign in Darfur entered its fifth year, a continuous series of aerial bombardments has been terrorizing civilians in northern Darfur for the past two weeks.

On April 29th, leaders of the Justice and Equality Movement (JEM), one of the main rebel groups in Darfur, said at least 12 bombs had fallen in the last week under areas of their control, leading to civilian casualties. The rebels alleged that bombings had been continuing for about a week. Despite the Sudanese government denying these charges per usual, a UN statement confirmed these statements saying that "repeated aerial attacks" have indeed been occurring.

After these reports, to the dismay of many, rebels and local organizations announced a few days later that bombings continued to specifically target civilians once again. According to JEM's London-based spokesman: "they killed 11 civilians and injured three women and two children when they bombed the market in Shugag Karo, near Deir Maza, on market day. There were a lot of people concentrated in one place....there was not any single armed element from the (rebel) movements in the area." (emphasis added). Local NGOs have said: "according to information gathered by the villagers of Shegeg Karo, the Antonov hovered for a long time and then bombed repeatedly." Some sources say that 35 children have been wounded from the bombing of the school. Top humanitarian officials are urgently seeking access to the victims.

The UN peacekeeping force failed to prevent these atrocities from occurring. Understandable, considering the majority of the force has not even deployed yet, months after its authorization. UNAMID officials excitedly say the first steps of deployment will finally be taken with a mere two battalions arriving in June and hope that 80% of the force will be deployed by the end of the year.

After all the energy (at least three major international peace conferences), effort (tedious debates over the deployment of UN peacekeepers), and fundraising (multiple large donor conferences) that has been poured into resolving this crisis from all over the world, can the international community really bear to see these grim circumstances as the current state of affairs? Lately, activists and policymakers have been celebrating every inch of progress as a huge accomplishment, overcoming the barriers of Sudanese obstruction. But does this "progress" at a snail's pace really merit its praise?

It's time to become practical and realistic in addressing this conflict that the Sudanese government has been masterfully manipulating. Two battalions in June will largely mean nothing. 80% of the peacekeeping force by the end of the year is not enough and is far too late. We dragged Somalia on in the 1990s, abandoned it as a lost cause, and look where it is now. Fortunately, Darfur is not a lost cause yet, primarily because ordinary citizens around the world continue to proactively express how they still care. Subsequently, it is about time that the policymakers that have the influence to create real progress start becoming proactive as well.